Ett av de intressantare gudsargumenten är det s.k. finjusteringsargumentet (FJA): "Av alla möjliga kombinationer av värden på naturkonstanterna, är det bara en ytterst liten mängd som tillåter ett universum innehållandes liv. Så bara slumpen kan inte förklara varför universum faktiskt innehåller liv, utan ett medvetet väsen måste ha skapat det: Gud."
Jag har i ett antal nätdebatter sett flera olika mer eller mindre övertygande invändningar resas mot ovanstående argument, men lustigt nog aldrig detta, som i mina ögon är sista spiken i kistan för FJA:
Keith Parsons skrev:
If someone insists that, nevertheless, we are very, very, very lucky--impossibly lucky--to have a universe as "life friendly" as the one we inhabit, and therefore there must have been a supernatural fine-tuner to set things up, I have to ask "Why doesn't that same reasoning apply to putative supernatural beings?" Why is it, that of all the ultimate supernatural beings that might have existed, we were so impossibly lucky as to get one that was a personal being who, amazingly, just happened to want creatures like us? Out of the innumerable types of imaginable ultimate supernatural beings--the vast majority of which either would not or could not have cared about us, or could not have created us--we had to be impossibly lucky to get the benevolent fine-tuner we did. Well, maybe the fine-tuner had a further fine-tuner that created him (her? it?). But this puts us on the road to an infinite regress. The only alternative is to take it as a brute, inexplicable fact that we got a supernatural being with just the right combination of powers and desires to get us. But if we say this, what is the advantage of this line over taking our present "finely tuned" laws of physics as a brute, inexplicable fact?
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Härifrån.)